Elections, Constitutional Morality, and the Battle for Power: Lessons from West Bengal and Tamil Nadu

 

Elections, Constitutional Morality, and the Battle for Power: Lessons from West Bengal and Tamil Nadu

The recent election results have thrown up two fascinating constitutional situations in India — one in West Bengal and another in Tamil Nadu.

While West Bengal presents a confrontation between constitutional convention and political defiance, Tamil Nadu raises deeper questions about hung assemblies, coalition arithmetic, gubernatorial discretion, and the fragility of mandate-driven governance.

At the heart of both situations lies one central constitutional principle: “In a parliamentary democracy, governments are formed not merely by electoral narratives, but by legislative majority”.

West Bengal: Can an Incumbent Chief Minister Refuse to Resign?: In West Bengal, despite a decisive electoral verdict, the incumbent Chief Minister has reportedly indicated reluctance to resign immediately, triggering political uncertainty and constitutional debate. Many assume that defeat in an election automatically removes a Chief Minister from office. Constitutionally, that is not entirely correct.

A Chief Minister does not automatically cease to hold office after the defeat in elections. Under the Constitution of India, the outgoing Chief Minister and Council of Ministers continue as a caretaker government until:

• they resign, 
• they are dismissed, 
• or a new ministry is sworn in

Merely losing an election politically does not instantaneously terminate office. The key constitutional provisions are:

• Article 164(1): Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. 
• Article 164(2): The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. 

So the real constitutional test is majority support in the Assembly, not the election result by itself.

Can a CM refuse to resign? - Technically, yes.

A CM may delay resignation and claim:

• alleged electoral malpractice, 
• pending recounts, 
• intra-party disputes, 
• or procedural grounds

However, such refusal has limited constitutional value because legitimacy depends on majority support in the newly constituted Assembly. In parliamentary systems, resignation after defeat is largely a constitutional convention, not an explicit textual requirement.

The Governor’s role: majority determination is central. The Governor cannot arbitrarily remove a CM merely because another party appears to have won politically. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that:

• majority must ordinarily be tested on the floor of the House, 
• not through Lok Bhavan assessments

Relevant cases include: S. R. Bommai v. Union of India & Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly 

So the Governor’s constitutionally safest path is usually:

• Ask the CM to prove majority
• Convene the Assembly quickly
• Hold a floor test

However, in this case, the tricky thing is, all those elected representatives in the previous elections have refused to resign. So, if the floor of test is to be conducted, will it be done with newly elected representatives or not? The outgoing Chief Minister is creating a confusion on this. 

Does the old government’s “legal term” automatically end?

The Legislative Assembly’s term expires (normally five years under Article 172), but the Council of Ministers does not vanish automatically at that instant. Instead, the outgoing ministry usually continues in a caretaker capacity, until the new Assembly is constituted and a new government takes office. So “automatic termination” is not the precise constitutional mechanism.

Can the Governor dismiss the CM directly? - Yes — but only in limited circumstances.

The phrase “pleasure of the Governor” does not mean unrestricted personal discretion. In practice, the Governor acts within constitutional conventions and judicially reviewable standards.

Dismissal becomes constitutionally defensible when:

• defeat is undeniable, 
• the CM refuses a floor test, 
• or the CM has demonstrably lost majority support

For example: if a party wins 220/294 seats and the incumbent has 70, and yet refuses resignation or floor test, the Governor may dismiss the ministry and invite the majority leader. Still, Governors are expected to avoid appearing partisan.

Can a new CM be appointed without the old CM resigning? Yes. Only If:

• the Governor is satisfied another leader commands majority, 
• and the incumbent either resigns or is dismissed, 

Once the new ministry is sworn in, the authority of the previous ministry ends constitutionally, regardless of whether a resignation letter was ceremonially submitted. 

The Constitution prioritizes majority confidence, not the symbolism of resignation.

What about President’s Rule under Article 356? – In this case of WB, this is not required but  an happen and this is a last resort.

The Governor may recommend President’s Rule only if:

• no party can form government, 
• constitutional machinery breaks down, 
• or stable governance becomes impossible.

However, after the S.R.Bommai verdict, courts scrutinize Article 356 very closely. So President’s Rule cannot constitutionally be the first response merely because a CM refuses resignation.

The constitutionally proper sequence is usually:

• Election results indicate incumbent defeat
• CM either resigns voluntarily or remains temporarily
• Governor asks for proof of majority
• Floor test is conducted
• If majority lost: CM resigns, or Governor dismisses ministry
• Majority party leader is invited to form government
• Article 356 considered only if no workable government emerges

Important nuance: India’s constitutional system runs heavily on:

• Constitutional conventions, 
• Judicial precedents, 
• and democratic legitimacy, 
• not merely literal textual provisions

So while the Governor possesses formal authority, its exercise is constrained by:

• Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
• federal principles, 
• and norms of responsible government

Tamil Nadu: The Hung Assembly Puzzle

The more complex constitutional drama may unfold in Tamil Nadu. With Tamizhaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) emerging as the single largest force but falling short of a clear majority, the state could witness intense coalition negotiations and constitutional manoeuvring.

Governor’s Constitutional Role in a Hung Assembly: The Governor of Tamil Nadu has the constitutional authority to:

• summon the Legislative Assembly,
• invite a claimant to form government,
• and require a floor test to establish majority support

This flows from:

• Article 163 (Governor acts with aid and advice except in limited discretion),
• Article 174 (summoning the House), and constitutional conventions developed through Supreme Court jurisprudence.

In a hung assembly, the Governor’s primary task is not political preference but determining: “Who is most likely to command the confidence of the House?”

There is no strict constitutional compulsion for a Governor to invite the single largest party to form the government in a hung assembly. While it is a strong convention, the Governor has discretionary power to invite a leader or coalition most likely to command a majority, prioritizing a stable government, based on guidelines from the Sarkaria Commission and Bommai judgment.

Floor Test Is the Constitutionally Preferred Mechanism: The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that majority should ordinarily be tested on the floor of the Assembly, not through subjective gubernatorial satisfaction.

Important precedents include:

• S. R. Bommai v. Union of India
• Jagdambika Pal case
• Shiv Sena government formation litigation in Maharashtra

So if the Tamizhaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) has 107 seats plus five of Congress, making it 112, and the majority mark is 118, the Governor would almost certainly require a floor test before confirming long-term legitimacy.

“TVK Needs 12+ MLAs” — Numerical Clarification Needed: This arithmetic appears inconsistent unless the nominated members, abstentions, vacancies, or reduced effective strength are involved.

In a 234-member Assembly, the majority mark is 118. TVK has 108, out of which, they have to forego 1 as Vijay has to resign from one constituency. 1 will go to Speaker although he can vote. This makes 107 and they need 12 more. Even if Congress supports, they need 7 more. They can scrape through if any of the bigger party decides to abstain from voting during the floor-test. However,  a Governor will not invite a party based on these speculations. 

Having opposed TVK in the elections and joining hands with them post-elections is plausible politically in India. If Indian National Congress extends outside support, it may:

• avoid joining government formally,
• support confidence motions,
• oppose BJP-aligned formations,
• and retain ideological distance

This resembles many historical coalition arrangements in India. But an important constitutional distinction exists: Support can be:

• pre-poll alliance support,
• post-poll coalition support,
• issue-based support,
• or outside support

For the Governor, what matters is the written proof of legislative backing.

• letters of support,
• signatures from MLAs,
• or alliance resolutions are sought

Smaller Parties as “Kingmakers”: In hung assemblies, smaller parties often become pivotal. Smaller parties could support, abstain, or negotiate conditional backing.

“Wafer-Thin Majority” and Government Stability: A narrow coalition majority tends to create:

• bargaining pressure,
• coalition fragility,
• vulnerability to defections,
• and constant negotiation with allies

However, India’s Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India does reduce outright floor-crossing compared to earlier decades. Still, resignations, splinter groups, rebel voting, and alliance withdrawals remain destabilizing tools.

Even if TVK wins, will it be a crown of thorns or comfort? 

Fiscal Concerns”

• annual expenditure,
• multi-year commitments,
• contingent liabilities,
• capital vs revenue spending,
• and aspirational vs immediate implementation

Similarly, Tamil Nadu’s debt discussion needs nuance. Tamil Nadu indeed carries substantial public debt, but:

• debt sustainability depends on GSDP ratio,
• revenue generation,
• interest burden,
• fiscal deficit trajectory,
• and economic growth

Most Important Constitutional Principle: Governments in India derive legitimacy from legislative majority, not electoral narrative alone. Therefore: public perception, media claims, moral arguments, or projected alliances do not substitute for demonstrated support on the Assembly floor. Ultimately, the decisive question is: “Who can command the confidence of the Legislative Assembly at the moment the House votes?”